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Wei Zhang† and Wei Zhang‡
Department of Physics, Jinan University,
Guangzhou 510632, China
(Dated: November 3, 2018)
In this paper, we investigate the non-signalized intersection issue considering traffic flow and
energy dissipation in terms of game theory based on the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model. There
are two types of driver agents at the intersection when vehicles on the two streets are approaching
to it simultaneously: C agents (cooperative strategy) pulling up to avoid collision and D agents
(defective strategy) crossing the intersection audaciously. Phase diagram of the system, which
describes free-flow phase, segregation phase, jammed phase and maximum current curve representing
the social maximum payoff, is presented. Dilemma game is observed at the phase-segregated state
except for the case of vmax = 1.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 45.70.Vn, 89.40.Bb
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, traffic problems have attracted much atten-
tion of a community of physicists because of the ob-
served nonequilibrium phase transitions and various non-
linear dynamical phenomena. In order to investigate
the dynamical behavior of the traffic flow, a number
of traffic models such as fluid dynamical models, gas-
kinetic models, car-following models and cellular au-
tomata (CA)models[1–4] have been proposed. These dy-
namical approaches represented complex physical phe-
nomena of traffic flow among which are hysteresis, syn-
chronization, wide moving jams, and phase transitions,
etc. Among these models, the advantages of CA ap-
proaches, which have been extensively applied and in-
vestigated, show the flexibility to adapt complicated fea-
tures observed in real vehicular traffic[1, 4, 5]. The Nagel-
Schreckenberg (NaSch) model is a basic CA models de-
scribing one-lane traffic flow[6]. Based on the NaSch
model, many CA models have been extended to inves-
tigate the properties of the system with realistic traffic
factors such as highway junctions, crossing, tollbooths
and speed limit zone[1, 4, 7–10].
Previously, scholars pay more attention to traffic flow
while investigating vehicular traffic issues. Most recently,
the problems of energy dissipation in traffic system have
been investigated widely[11–17] for environmental pollu-
tion and energy dissipation caused by vehicular traffic
have become more and more significant in modern so-
ciety. Intersections are fundamental units of complex
city traffic networks. Optimization of traffic flow and
energy consumption at a isolated intersection is a sub-
stantial ingredient for the task of global optimization
of city networks. During the past ten years, physicists
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have paid notable attention to controlling traffic flow at
intersections[8, 18–22]. However, to our knowledge, none
of these previous studies about intersections issue present
energy dissipation information, which should be further
investigated.
Signal control works only for major intersections but
in most cases, signal system is not installed due to cost.
Drivers at the intersection without signal system can
only communicate each other by eye contact and make
a decision based on own judgment. Most of the previ-
ous studies focus only on the kinetics of the self-driven
multi particle system and ignore the effect of drivers’ de-
cisions on the entire system. In this paper, considering
traffic flow and energy dissipation, we add a game the-
ory framework[23–25] as a rational decision process to
the traffic model with a non-signalized intersection, and
demonstrate that the intersection has a dilemma struc-
ture. In addition, the phase diagram which shows the
social maximum payoff is presented.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II is de-
voted to the description of the problem. In section III,
the results of the numerical experiment are given and
discussed. Finally, the conclusions are given in section
IV.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
In this section, we present a CA model with two per-
pendicular one dimensional closed chains. The chains
represent urban streets accommodating unidirectional
vehicular traffic flow. The direction of traffic flow in the
first chain is from south to north and from east to west in
the second chain, as shown in figure 1. Each street con-
sists of L cells of equal size numbered by i = 1, 2, · · · , L
and the time is discrete. The two chains intersect each
other at the sites i1 = i2 = L/2 on the first and second
chains respectively. Each site can be either empty or oc-
cupied by a vehicle with the speed v = 0, 1, 2, · · · , vmax,
where vmax is the speed limit. Let x(i, t) and v(i, t) de-
2note the position and the velocity of the ith car at time t,
respectively. The number of empty cells in front of the ith
vehicle is denoted by d(i, t) = x(i+1, t)−x(i, t)−1 . The
evolution dynamics is based on the Nagel-Schreckenberg
(NaSch) model. The updating rules of the NaSch model
are as follows:
(1) Acceleration:
v(i, t+ 1/3)→ min[v(i, t) + 1, vmax];
(2) Slowing down:
v(i, t+ 2/3)→ min[v(i, t+ 1/3), d(i, t)];
(3) Stochastic braking:
v(i, t+1)→ max[v(i, t+2/3)−1, 0] with the probability
p;
(4) Movement: x(i, t+ 1)→ x(i, t) + v(i, t+ 1).
The above four steps for all vehicles update in parallel
with periodic boundary.
Vehicles without interactions of vehicles on the perpen-
dicular streets evolve under the NaSch dynamics. How-
ever, how does the vehicle approaching to the intersec-
tion evolve when vehicle on the other street approaches to
the intersection simultaneously? The approaching driver
to the intersection need considering not only the condi-
tion of it’s front vehicle but also the situation of the ap-
proaching vehicle on the perpendicular street. Different
drivers perform differently even at the same condition.
The decision-making process of the driver approaching
to the intersection is described by game theory, i.e., we
assume that drivers have a strategy that is either co-
operative or defective. Cooperative drivers (C agents)
pull up in the front of the intersection to avoid collision.
Defective drivers (D agents) cross the intersection auda-
ciously. At the same time, if the two drivers approaching
to the intersection on the two streets are all D agents, i.e.,
the two drivers adopt defective strategy simultaneously,
traffic accident would occur. Different from ”the pris-
oners’ dilemma”[26], one may find that ”non-tit-for-tat”
(I’ll cooperate (defect) with you if you defect (cooper-
ate) with me) is a comparatively effective strategy for
playing the drivers’s dilemma. During the simulation, to
avoid collision, we assume that at the same time if the
driver approaching to the intersection on the first street
is D agent (C agent), the driver approaching to the inter-
section on the second street adopts cooperative strategy
(defective strategy). The probability of the situation that
two approaching drivers to the intersection are D agents
or C agents to occur is very small. In most cases of real
traffic, only one approaching driver to the intersection is
D agent and the other is C agent. Let Pd denotes the
probability that the driver approaching to the intersec-
tion on the first street adopt defective strategy when the
other driver on the second street is also approaching to
the intersection at the same time.
The payoff indicates traffic flow J which is the prod-
uct of the mean velocity and vehicle density. Except for
traffic flow, energy problem is an important issue in traf-
fic system. The kinetic energy of the vehicle with the
velocity v is mv2/2, where m is the mass of the vehi-
cle. When braking the kinetic energy reduces. Let Ed
FIG. 1: Illustration of the intersection of two uni-directional
streets with periodic boundary. They cross each other at
halfway.
denotes energy dissipation rate per time step per vehicle.
For simple, we neglect rolling and air drag dissipation
and other dissipation such as the energy needed to keep
the motor running while the vehicle is standing in our
analysis, i.e., we only consider the energy lost caused by
speed-down. The dissipated energy of ith vehicle from
time t− 1 to t is defined by
e(i, t) =
{
m
2
[
v2(i, t− 1)− v2(i, t)
]
for v(i, t) < v(i, t− 1)
0 for v(i, t) > v(i, t− 1).
(1)
Thus, the energy dissipation rate
Ed =
1
T
1
N
t0+T∑
t=t0+1
N∑
i=1
e(i, t), (2)
where N is the number of vehicles in the system and t0
is the relaxation time, taken as t0 = 1.5 × 10
4. In this
model, the particles are ”self-driven” and the kinetic en-
ergy increases in the acceleration step. In the stationary
state, the value of the increased energy while accelerat-
ing is equivalent to that of the dissipated energy caused
by speed-down, and the kinetic energy is constant in the
system.
In the simulation, the system size L = 500 and N1 =
N2 are selected where N1 (N2) is the number of vehicles
on the first street (second street) , and the stochastic
braking is not considered, i.e., p = 0. The numerical
results are obtained by averaging over 20 initial configu-
rations and 5× 103 time steps after discarding 1.5× 104
initial transient states.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
First of all, we investigate the influences of the drivers’
decision on the social average payoff based on the de-
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FIG. 2: The social average payoff J as a function of the vehicle
density ρ in the case of vmax = 5 and p = 0 for various values
of the probability Pd. The social average payoff indicates the
mean current of the traffic system with a single intersection.
terministic NaSch model with the speed limit vmax = 5.
Figure 2 shows the average payoff J as a function of the
vehicle density ρ with the probability 06 Pd 6 0.5. Be-
cause of the equivalence of the two streets, the condition
inverts while 0.56 Pd 6 1. As shown in Fig. 2, there
is a critical density ρc1 = 0.0625 below which Pd has
no influence on social average payoff and J increases lin-
early with the vehicle density. Above the critical den-
sity ρc1, J undergoes a short rapid increase or decrease
after which the plateau arises whose height and length
are determined by the probability Pd. After the plateau,
J exhibits linear decrease with the increase of vehicle
density. The intersection of the two streets makes the
crossing point appear as a sidewise dynamical defective
site. The localized defect has global effects whereby the
traffic exhibits macroscopic phase segregation into low-
density and high-density regions. For the first street, the
smaller the probability Pd is, the stronger is the dynamic
defect. Considering the payoff of each street, the larger
the probability that an approaching driver to the inter-
section adopts defective strategy, the larger the payoff
of the driver and the street on which the agent drivers
are. However, for different vehicle density, the maximum
social mean payoff corresponds to different values of Pd.
Except for ρc1, there are two critical density ρc2 =
0.167 below which J is largest in the case of Pd = 0.0
and ρc3 = 0.67 above which J is largest in the case of
Pd = 0.5. For the whole density region, the maximal
social average payoff Jmax = vmax/2(vmax + 1) appears
at the critical density ρc2.
Figure 3 exhibits the relation of J to the probability
Pd with various values of the vehicle density ρ in the case
of vmax = 5. As expected, the symmetry center of the
curve is at Pd = 0.5 for the two streets are equivalent
in our model. While ρ > ρc3, with the increase of the
probability Pd, J first increases and then decreases af-
ter a maximum value is reached. In the density interval
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.12
0.16
0.20
0.24
0.28
0.32
0.36
0.40
P
d
J
U=0.16
U=0.30
U=0.40
U=0.50
U=0.60
U=0.70
U=0.73
FIG. 3: The social average payoff J as a function of the prob-
ability Pd in the case of vmax = 5 and p = 0 for various values
of the vehicle density ρ.
ρc2 < ρ < ρc3, J increases with Pd to the maximum,
then it decreases with Pd until Pd = 0.5. After the point,
J exhibits an increase and decreases subsequently after
the maximum is reached. In the density interval ρc1 <
ρ < ρc2, with the increases of the probability Pd, J first
decreases and increases after a minimum value is reached.
It is noted that when ρc1 < ρ < ρc2 at the probability Pd
interval that the two maximal J appears, curves collapse
into one curve which is the social payoff at ρc1.
Except for fundamental diagram (J versus ρ), it is
worthwhile to investigate the energy dissipation diagram
of the system with a intersection. Figure 4 shows the
relation of energy dissipation rate Ed to the vehicle den-
sity ρ with various values of Pd in the case of vmax = 5.
As shown in Fig. 4, there are three critical density ρc1
below which no energy dissipation occurs, ρc2 at which
there is no energy dissipation in the case of Pd = 0.0,
and ρc3 above which Ed is largest when Pd = 0.5. While
ρ→ ρc1, with the decrease of Pd, energy dissipation rate
Ed reduces. And while Pd = 0.0, Ed is minimal in the
density interval ρc1 < ρ < ρc2, which is contrary to traffic
flow J. The value of Ed decreases as Pd increases in the
middle density region, but increases in the high density
region.
From the viewpoint of individual benefit, adopting the
higher payoff strategy is more rational than using the
opposite strategy. For agents on the first street, the larger
the Pd is, the more payoff they obtain. For agents on the
second street, the smaller the Pd is, the more payoff they
acquire. When the system reaches equilibrium state, the
probability that drivers approaching to the intersection
adopt defective strategy is 0.5. However, when Pd = 0.5
the average social payoff is not maximum, but minimum
in the density interval ρc1 < ρ < ρc3, which is a social
dilemma.
From Fig. 2 and 4, one should noted that in the den-
sity interval ρc1 < ρ < ρc2, if Pd = 0.0 i.e., drivers on the
first street (second street) are all C agents (D agents), the
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FIG. 4: Energy dissipation rate Ed (scaled by m ) as a func-
tion of the vehicle density ρ in the case of vmax = 5 and p = 0
for various values of the probability Pd.
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FIG. 5: Illustration of the ρ-Pd phase diagram in the case
of vmax = 5 and p = 0. The closed circles in the diagram
represent the maximum payoff for different vehicle density.
payoff of the whole system is maximal and energy dissi-
pation is minimal. The best situation having high social
efficiency is that drivers on one of the two streets always
pull up and let drivers on the other street cross, while the
interactions of vehicles on the two streets emerges. How-
ever, C agents pulling up for a long time has a robust
incentive to adopt defective strategy for D agents can
obtain higher payoff than C agents. Thus, the probabil-
ity Pd always increases, finally reaching absorbed equi-
librium Pd = 0.5, where the probability that D agents
appear on the two streets is the same.
When ρ > ρc3, the internal equilibrium point Pd = 0.5
is consistent with the social maximum payoff where no so-
cial dilemma occurs. This implies that in the jam state D
agents appearing on the two streets with the same prob-
ability can improve flow efficiency of the system, rather
than only drivers on the second street adopt defective
strategy.
1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 Numerical results
 Theoretical curve
U 1
v
max
FIG. 6: The critical density ρc1 as a function of the speed
limit vmax in the case of p = 0. Symbol data are obtained from
computer simulations, and solid line corresponds to analytic
results of the formula (3).
Figure 5 shows the ρ-Pd phase diagram with the speed
limit vmax = 5. There are four traffic phases: free-
flow, phase-segregated 1, phase-segregated 2 and jammed
phase, which are separated by the critical density ρc1,
ρc2 and ρc3, as shown in Fig. 5. The solid circle sym-
bols in Fig.5 represent the maximum social payoff. In the
free-flow phase in which vehicles can move freely, there
are no interactions of vehicles in the system and no en-
ergy dissipation to occur. In the phase-segregated region,
the macroscopic traffic phase segregates into high-density
and low-density region. In the phase-segregated 1 state,
the maximal current consists with the minimal energy
dissipation rate. The maximum social payoff appears at
Pd = 0.0 or Pd = 1.0. In the phase-segregated 2 state,
however, the maximal current consists with the maximal
energy dissipation rate and Ed increases with traffic flow
J. The probability Pd consistent with the maximal cur-
rent increases exponentially with the increase of vehicle
density while Pd < 0.5. However, when 0.5 < Pd < 1.0,
Pd consistent with the maximal current decreases with
the increase of ρ. In the jammed phase, the probability
Pd consistent with the maximal current is independent
of ρ and equals 0.5.
Next, we quantitatively analyze the critical density ρc1,
ρc2 and ρc3 for different speed limit vmax. While the mean
distance-headway is greater than 3vmax+1, there are no
interactions of vehicles in the system and vehicles on the
perpendicular streets can move freely. Consequently, the
critical density ρc1 below which vehicles move freely and
no energy dissipation occurs, can be written as
ρc1 =
1
3vmax + 1
. (3)
Figure 6 exhibits the relation of the critical density
ρc1to the speed limit vmax. Formula (3) gives an agree-
ment with numerical results in Fig.6. At the critical den-
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FIG. 7: The social average payoff J as a function of the vehicle
density ρ in the case of vmax = 1 and p = 0 for various values
of the probability Pd.
sity ρc2, vehicles on the second street (first street) can
move freely in the case of Pd = 0.0 (Pd = 1.0). Thus, the
critical density ρc2 is given as
ρc2 =
1
vmax + 1
. (4)
Above the critical density ρc3, high-density region ex-
pands into the whole system. The critical point ρc3 is
not determined by the speed limit vmax and in the case
of Pd = 0.5, ρc3 can be written as
ρc3 =
1/Pd
1 + 1/Pd
=
3
2
. (5)
However, for the case of vmax = 1, traffic flow and
energy dissipation exhibit different features. As shown
in Fig. 7, there is only one plateau whose height value
is equal to 0.25 for different values of Pd. The length of
the plateau increases with the increase of Pd, for 0.0<
Pd 6 0.5. In the case of Pd = 0.0, there is no plateau
and the maximal J, whose value equals to 0.25, appears
at the critical density point ρc2, above which J exhibits
linear decrease with the increase of vehicle density. After
the critical density ρc1, the social average payoff J is
maximum in the case of Pd = 0.5 and is minimum in
the case of Pd = 0.0. Consequently, there is no social
dilemma in the case of vmax = 1.
In the plateau region, for the case of vmax = 1, the
probability that a approaching vehicle on the first street
crosses the intersection per time step is Pd/2 and is (1-
Pd)/2 on the second street. Thus, the social average
payoff in the plateau region is 0.25 and does not depend
on Pd.
Figure 8 shows energy dissipation rate Ed as a function
of the vehicle density ρ with various values of the prob-
ability Pd in the case of vmax = 1. As shown in Fig.8,
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FIG. 8: Energy dissipation rate Ed (scaled by m ) as a func-
tion of the vehicle density ρ in the case of vmax = 1 and p = 0
for various values of the probability Pd.
there are two critical density ρc1 below which no energy
dissipation occurs, and ρc2 at which no go-and-stop ve-
hicles appear when Pd = 0.0. The energy dissipation rate
Ed increases with the increase of Pd for 0.06 Pd 6 0.5,
which is different from that for vmax > 1. Considering
the ρ-Pd phase diagram, there is no differences between
phase-segregated 1 and phase-segregated 2, and Pd con-
sistent with the maximal social payoff is always equal to
0.5 and independent of ρ in phase-segregated and jammed
states (not shown). Therefore these results indicate that
different correlations of spacetime exist between the case
of vmax = 1 and vmax > 1.
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper, we investigated the social dilemma struc-
ture in a traffic model with a non-signalized intersection
based on the NaSch model. The model contains a game
theory framework to deal with drivers’ decision-making
processes. We studied the effects of the drivers’ decision
on traffic flow and energy dissipation at different traffic
phases.
Numerical results indicate that in the case of vmax > 1
the social dilemma appears at the phase-segregated states
and no dilemma exists at other traffic phases. At the
phase-segregated states, selfish drivers crossing the inter-
section can obtain a higher payoff than altruistic drivers
pulling up in the front of the intersection, but they
cause a remarkable decrease in social efficiency when they
emerge alternately on the two streets. In contrast to the
phase-segregated states, in the jammed phase, the so-
cial efficiency is maximal at the absorbed equilibrium
Pd = 0.5. Different from that in the case of vmax > 1,
in the case of vmax = 1, there is no dilemma to occur no
matter in the phase-segregated and jammed states.
In addition, the three critical density ρc1, ρc2 and
6ρc3 were analyzed quantitatively and theoretical analy-
ses give an excellent agreement with numerical results.
However, explicit expressions about the maximum so-
cial payoff curve in the ρ-Pd phase diagram do not be
obtained because of effects of long length of time space
correlations, and deserve further investigate.
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